

development now or to place any hopes in parties which have once failed. The Chinese have no romantic attachment to lost causes and do not seek for restorations.

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A Century of Conflict: Communist Techniques of World Revolution. BY STEFAN T. POSSONY. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company. 1953. Pp. xx, 439. \$7.50.)

At a time when comfortable illusions about the Soviet Union are again gaining strength in the West, Dr. Possony's analysis of "the nature of the beast" (p. x) is most welcome. He performs a great service in presenting a comprehensive and, I believe, essentially correct picture of the "doctrine of conflict management," the "operational know-how" of communist leaderships.

Particularly, he shows the high and increasing role attributed to violence, and especially war, in the Bolshevik operational code. Both intellectually and politically, Dr. Possony's points in this area are of great importance.

Finding myself in broad agreement with the author, I shall indicate some of the special points about which questions might be raised. (All italics in quotations are by the reviewer.)

1. The author does not always conform to scientific method. Thus he believes that "it is worth recording that, *according to a most knowledgeable German source* 'during the depression years German industry was kept afloat largely because it received substantial orders from the Russians,' especially [sic] gold and raw materials" (p. 204). The matter seems to call either for an analysis of the relevant German figures for 1929-1932 by Dr. Possony himself, or for a quotation from a published analysis by a named reputable economist. Again, Dr. Possony seems to be rather certain that he knows the approximate incidence of various kinds of sanctions imposed in France after the liberation of persons alleged to have been "collaborationists." Yet his certainty is not based on a full study of this contentious and obscure matter either by himself or by another reputable scholar. He simply accepts the figures (which of course may be true) of one partisan French source, without describing its affiliations or examining the various arguments which would affect (favorably or unfavorably) a scientist's estimate of its reliability (pp. 288-89). The author accepts (pp. 279-81) in a similar way the genuineness of purported instructions sent by the executive committee of the Comintern to the Yugoslav party on May 9, 1941. (He gives as his sources Stephen Clissold's *Whirlwind* and Leigh White's *Balkan Caesar*.) If there were space, I could give a number of grounds for my belief that the document is a gross forgery. Another illustration of this type of methodological shortcoming is his arriving at the certainty that a "German-Bolshevik conspiracy" existed between 1914 and 1918 (pp. 42-48). Given the state of the sources, chiefly the so-called Sisson documents, any certainty on the matter is probably impossible; to arrive even at the assessment of probabilities a lengthy critical analysis would have to be executed, and this the author does not attempt.

At various points Dr. Possony makes unusual statements for which he offers no evidence. Thus he affirms that the technique of the so-called expropriations was "invented" by Stalin (p. 12); that in the fall of 1917, when Lenin from his hiding place in Finland called for an immediate seizure of power, his "ideas were received skeptically by the comrades at Petrograd who apparently thought that Lenin was willing to risk his followers while hiding in safety himself" (p. 60); that, in Bolshevik political tactics, "if simple deception cannot be relied upon, double deception must be resorted to. One actually must carry out what one appears to be doing, on the theory that the enemy will assume that one does something else" (pp. 380-81); that "it is within the capabilities of . . . Western policy to transform the iron curtain into a straw mat" (p. 422).

2. While Dr. Possony refers to many details of history which are not objects of contention among specialists, his statements are not always correct. He implies that Maxim Gorky's role at the Capri school was comparable to Lenin's at Longjumeau (p. 118). He speaks of the "decisive link" as "Stalin's concept" (p. 185). He implies that it was the fifth congress of the Comintern in 1924 which was particularly and favorably concerned with the idea of a "workers' government." After citing Nikolayevsky's excellent book about Azev, he maintains that this agent provocateur "operated against the Bolsheviks" (p. 222). He affirms that those who voted for the Mensheviks and the right Social-Revolutionaries in the Russian elections of 1917 "may have had tactical differences with the Bolsheviks, but there was no difference in principle" (pp. 29-30). The truth of this sentence seems to depend on the meaning one decides to give to the ambiguous term "principle." If attitudes towards democracy (in the Western sense) involve "principles," the statement does not seem to be correct. According to the author, "in communist terminology the word 'peace' . . . can denote the non-conflict type of political relationship in a classless society; but whenever the term carries this meaning in communist writings, it is spelled out clearly" (p. 413). Actually, the standard Bolshevik description of "communism" does not contain the term "peace" which is to high-level communists entirely exoteric. (This, by the way, strengthens Dr. Possony's main argument in the matter.)

3. Dr. Possony's interpretations of Bolshevik doctrine are sometimes open to question. Discussing the Comintern congress of 1935, Dr. Possony says that "Dimitrov and his associates hoped that a revolutionary movement could be built on the exploitation of local and temporary grievances without the emergence of an over-all political consciousness. . . . Such a hope was in contrast to the basic tenets of Leninism and Stalinism" (pp. 212-13). But the reduction of the role attributed to the "consciousness" of the "masses" is one of the main trends of Bolshevism—as the author himself implies when he says that "communists gain popular support not through pushing their own platform, but by espousing non-communist ideas" (p. viii).

Repeatedly (cf. pp. 60, 176-77, 214, 417) Dr. Possony presents what he affirms to be typical communist policy calculations as divided into a "thesis," "antithesis" (or "double antithesis") and "synthesis." As he points out, he

introduces in these instances "a type of dialectics which will probably amaze the college professors teaching Hegel and Marx." He adds: "Yet this is how abstract philosophy can be applied in practice." I believe that this particular practice is entirely Dr. Possony's. He offers no evidence to show that "communists draw up their operational plans according to the dialectic scheme" as he presents it—unless all that is involved is the intent simultaneously to strengthen the party and to weaken the enemy (cf. pp. 176–77). But in this case, again, there is no evidence that communists believe they are applying "dialectics" when they are engaging in this nondistinctive mode of planning.

4. In his eagerness to establish certain points the author does not entirely avoid questionable reasoning. In trying to show that the favorable relations between Berlin and Moscow in 1939–1940 were related to earlier manifestations of "the German-Bolshevik conspiracy," he writes: "The fact . . . that Stalin helped Hitler . . . *can be explained logically only* if it is assumed . . . that the Soviets considered the Western powers their most dangerous opponents." "Logically," there are other possibilities: viewing the Nazis as "their most dangerous opponents," the Soviets may have wanted to deflect the Nazis' expansion towards the West, etc. Also, according to Dr. Possony, "Stalin's alliance with Germany . . . is easy enough to understand unless the tenuous ideological differences between nazism and communism are overstressed" (pp. 253–54). What is important here, however, is not whether these differences are "tenuous" to Western antitotalitarians, but to the communist leaders themselves; and on this point Dr. Possony offers no satisfactory evidence.

5. Dr. Possony tends to exaggerate the intellectual level of communist doctrine—a level which has never been high and has been steadily sinking. According to the author "communist techniques of expansion" are "based upon elaborate studies in the humanities and social sciences" (p. v). What are these studies? Also Stalin "has written *many* professional papers on [military] strategy and tactics" (p. 247). Again, what are these papers? In addition, "he is intimately familiar with morale problems." As shown by what subtle analysis of the subjective aspects of war?

6. The influence of Clausewitz on Lenin is exaggerated: "Sometimes between 1913 and 1915 Lenin studied the works of Karl von Clausewitz. . . . Marx gave Lenin . . . a method of analyzing political situations. Clausewitz taught the bolsheviks the secret of operations" (p. 20). However, many of the specifically Bolshevik proclivities in operations had been expressed, in word and act, before 1913.

7. The author pays perhaps too little attention to differentiations of the Bolshevik operational code according to techniques and situations. Thus it may well be that in war it may seem to Bolsheviks "advisable to feign a retreat to lure the enemy into an ill-considered advance" (p. 395). But in situations where violence is not the major device used Bolsheviks are rather adverse to this procedure.

8. Dr. Possony tends to exaggerate the skill which the leadership of the Soviet Union has shown in its external relations. He does not analyze the signifi-

cance of the fact that Moscow did not perceive the imminence of a German attack in the spring of 1941. A ruling group whose major obsession, for two decades, had been an annihilatory attack from without, had throughout the years mistakenly pointed to its imminence. When it finally came, that ruling group was tactically unprepared. Nor does Dr. Possony give an account of the disasters (for Moscow) of the first four months of war. In his conclusion he recalls that "they [the Soviets] escaped destruction only by the skin of their teeth," but in his brief account of 1941-1942 he merely points out that "although the Soviets seemed pleased with their successes against Hitler's blitzkrieg, on close analysis they appear less impressive. . . . Hitler risked attacking the Soviet Union with a relatively weak air force and . . . against a four-fold Russian tank superiority" (p. 255). Dr. Possony mentions figures for German losses in 1941 (p. 256), but, as far as I could discover, he does not indicate his estimates of the damage inflicted on the Soviet forces.

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Conscription of Conscience: The American State and the Conscientious Objector, 1940-1947. BY MULFORD Q. SIBLEY and PHILIP E. JACOB. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1952. Pp. x, 580. \$6.50.)

This book is an invaluable addition to the literature of American civil liberty. Written by two young political scientists, it should command the close interest and deep respect of all their colleagues, for it is a book in which the political science profession can take great pride. Long, filled with great detail, but always carefully organized and interestingly written, the book tells in exceedingly impressive and authoritative fashion the story of American conscientious objection to military service in World War II. The authors have undertaken their research and reported their findings with seeming accuracy and completeness, with understanding of and sympathy for the conscientious objector, but also with dispassion, balance, and perspective. For this reviewer, at least, no recent work by a political scientist comes any closer to an ideal expression and realization of the interests and talents of our particular discipline. The complexity and profundity of the political problem here under observation, the mountain of data accumulated, and the varied and sophisticated insights of its pages give this book a high value, indeed, for all students of the political process.

No brief review can possibly indicate the scope or excellence of this volume. For one thing, it is a study both of policy making and of administration, and of very great interest in both respects. In Parts 1 and 2, the authors define the problem of conscientious objection in the modern state, giving it historical depth and philosophic perspective, and describe the making of the American policy of World War II. This policy was essentially one of extending objector status to members of organized religious groups whose creeds included objection to war. Such status extended only to those who were opposed to combatant service with the armed forces; it did not extend to those who opposed noncombatant service under civilian auspices (the "absolutists"), and it did not extend